This paper looks at the effects of unemployment on subsequent wages for men using the first six waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) conducted over the period [1991][1992][1993][1994][1995][1996]. In particular, how the effect of an interruption on subsequent wages changes over time and whether the type of interruption itself matters or not for subsequent wages is addressed. The issue of sample selection and unobserved heterogeneity is also addressed in the analyses. This study finds that, unemployment does have a scarring effect on individuals who experience it, in terms of earnings losses in subsequent job. In particular it finds that, an unemployed individual on returning to work will earn about 5% less than an otherwise equivalent individual who entered the job from another job, during the first year of employment. This differential diminishes over time but it takes about five years of employment with the same employer to completely negate this effect. In addition, relative to a man who has never experienced a spell of unemployment, a man who experiences a spell of unemployment is estimated to be permanently scarred in the sense of earning losses of about 10%. It is the first spell of unemployment that is found to have the largest effect on wages. 
INTRODUCTION
It is generally found that, an experience of unemployment increases the chances of a future unemployment experience.
1 This is not a major concern if say for example, these individuals who experience these unemployment spells are just in and out of employment without any other lasting effect. But, a policy intervention will be required if these individuals are 'scarred' by their unemployment experiences, in the sense of being paid less than an otherwise equivalent individual who has not experienced an unemployment spell. 2 The scarring effect will not only contribute to wage inequality and poverty but, can also interfere with work incentives. This paper investigates this issue of scarring. In particular, this paper seeks an answer to the question on whether individuals who enter a job via a spell of unemployment, experience only an initial temporary loss in earnings relative to individuals who make a job to job transition, or whether the loss is permanent
There are many theoretical reasons why individuals experiencing a spell of unemployment might incur a wage loss in their post unemployment job. These theories are usually couched in terms of either a standard human capital framework or a search/job-match theoretic framework. First, individuals possessing non-transferable firm specific skills will experience a wage loss in their new job. Second, employers might use an individual's unemployment history in order to sort good workers from bad workers (Lockwood (1991) ) and this might result in loss of wage if the employer, at least initially, decides to pay the individual less than his/her marginal product. This happens if employers perceive, rightly or wrongly, that, individuals lose acquired human capital during a spell out of employment (Pissarides (1992) ).
Third, an unemployed individual for various reasons (loss of unemployment benefits, liquidity 1 For Britain, see Narendranathan and Elias (1993) , Arulampalam et al (2000) . 2 Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) argue that labour supply shocks and cost shocks have been responsible for increases in the so-called 'low-quality' jobs in the 1990 relative to the 1970s and that these jobs are being taken up by individuals who are non-employed. Stewart (2000) argues that a reason for observed persistence in the unemployment status is due to individuals who experience unemployment going into jobs that are low paid and unstable. Boheim and Taylor (2000) find that jobs that follow an unemployment spell have shorter mean duration than other jobs.
constraints, disutility from leisure etc.), might revise his/her reservation wage downwards as the spell lengthens, and incur a wage loss.
But it is also possible that post-unemployment wage might be higher than the preunemployment wage if for example, the individual voluntarily changes jobs with an intervening spell of unemployment in order to improve his/her earnings. An unemployment spell also might help an individual to search better for a better-matched job giving a wage gain.
Although there has been an extensive literature on the effect of displacement on subsequent earnings, these studies had been mainly confined to the North America (Podgursky and Swaim (1987) , Addison and Portugal (1989) , Ruhm (1991) , Farber (1993) , and Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) , to name but a few; and, in a different context, Chowdhury and Nickell (1985) ,). 3 But the past few years have seen a revival of interest and very recently many studies have looked at the effects of displacement in a cross country comparative context (see for example, Bender etal (1999) , Abbring etal (1998) , Albaek etal (1998) ). 4 The North American studies have mainly used information from 'Displacement Worker Surveys' where the displacement is defined as loss of a job due to either a plant closure or a layoff. The analysis is usually confined to a comparison of post-displacement wage with that of pre-displacement wage.
These studies conclude that these individuals do experience a wage loss especially when they lose a long-tenured job. These losses are also found to be persistent over many years.
Some British Studies, which have looked at this issue in a slightly different context are, Garcia and Stern (1989) , Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) , Gregory and Jukes (1997 ), Borland etal. (1998 ) and, Nickell etal. (1999 . 5 This paper differs from these studies in many respects. In particular, the study addresses the following: (i) does the wage effect of the spell interruption vary with the type of interruption?;(ii) are the effects of interruption temporary and if so how 3 For a survey of the effects of worker displacement, see Fallick (1996) . 4 These were some of the papers presented at the conference on 'Displaced Workers' held in Canada, September, 1998. 5 Unlike this study, most of these studies do not distinguish 'employment-to-employment' movements from 'unemployment-to-employment' movements. long do they last for?; (iii) does the type of interruption have an effect on the post-interruption earnings? (iv) is it only the incidence of interruption matters or does the actual duration of the spell interruption also has an impact on post-interruption earnings.
This study uses a sample of men drawn from the British Household Panel Survey data (BHPS) over the period 1991 to 1996 to address the issue of the effect of an interruption on the subsequent wages. Except for the study by Borland et al (1998) , all the other studies used different data sets. The manner in which the problem is formulated in this study and the specific questions addressed are dissimilar to these other studies. For example, Nickell et al (1999) and Gregory and Jukes (1997) look at the effects of the last unemployment spell on current wages. In these studies, it is possible for some of the individuals who are currently employed to have changed employers since their last unemployment experience. This paper looks at the scarring effect of unemployment in terms of whether the returns to current employer tenure is dependent on the previous labour market status. Hence the estimated wage losses are due to immediately preceding spell of unemployment. The data set used in this study has information about the cause of job loss or change, and this enables one to look at the effects of voluntary versus involuntary separation. The panel nature of the data set also allows one to control for unobservable individual characteristics in the estimation.
There are two important related econometric issues that need to be dealt with, in this type of analysis. The first is to do with unobserved heterogeneity. In the standard human capital model, returns to tenure and experience are interpreted as returns to specific and general human capital respectively. In these models, high tenure workers are better paid because their productivity rises with time on the job and more experience implies more acquired general skills.
But, search models have been put forward as an alternative. Here the explanation given for the returns to tenure and experience is in terms of selectivity and matching arguments. The selectivity argument is that more able workers will face better promotion prospects and thus will 6 have high tenure. The matching argument is that a match between a firm and an individual will last longer if it is a 'good' match and also more experienced workers would have had more time to find a good match. Tenure and experience variables are thus functions of past quit and lay-off decisions. As a result, tenure and experience variables will be correlated with unobservable job specific or match specific variables. Hence, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of a standard earnings function using cross-sectional data will produce biased estimates of the returns to tenure and experience. 6 Hence, unobservable individual heterogeneity and unobservable jobmatch heterogeneity need to be accounted for in the estimation. Given our data set, we are unable to distinguish the cause of positive returns to tenure. Since the data is longitudinal we are able to account for unobserved heterogeneity. The data set is also rich in terms of firm and job characteristics and we are thus able to control for these in our analysis. To deal with this issue, on requires at least two wage observations per individual per employment spell with the same employer. This takes us to the second econometric issue that is the possibility of sample selection bias. The issues of unobservables and sample selection are addressed in this paper.
Active labour market policies such as training for the unemployed generally provide general skills rather than specific skills. In contrast, wage subsidies to employers to employ people from the unemployment stock assumes that the individuals would gain enough specific skills to make them employable without the subsidy. Thus, the extent to which individuals are scarred in terms of loss of earnings as a result of the experience of a spell out-of-employment has very important implications for active labour market policies.
In Section 2 of the paper, the econometric model chosen to deal with these problems is elaborated. The data and the sample used for the analysis are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents and discusses the basic model estimates and some model extensions are considered in Section 5. The final section summarises and concludes. Some examples of studies which have tried to address the issue of endogeneity of tenure are, Abraham and Farber (1987) , Altonji and Shakotko (1987) , Topel (1991), Altonji and Williams (1997) , and Dustmann and Meghir (1998).
THE MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
In order to look at the effects of job interruptions on subsequent earnings, we start with the standard earnings function. Consider the following log-linear earnings equation:
where w it is the natural logarithm of earnings at time t for individual i; x it is a vector of observable variables on both individual as well as firm characteristics which can be time varying or invariant; α i is an individual specific error term capturing the effects of unobservable characteristics such as 'ability'; and u it is the equation error term.
The possible correlation between the unobservables and the observables need to be accounted for in the estimation of the parameters of interest, β β β β. Hence the above model is estimated using within-group (WG) estimation, which is a simple least squares estimation of the model in which the variables are defined as deviations from their individual means.
Controlling for unobservables in the above manner requires at least two wage observations per individual. The correction for possible sample selection bias is carried out by an addition of the standard Heckman correction term in the wage equation. This essentially is a cross-section analysis. Any biases that are time invariant due to sample selection are already accounted for in the WG estimation. In order to allow for possible time-varying biases, the selection term was interacted with time dummies in the models estimated. 
THE DATA
The data used for the analyses is from the first six waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) which is a nationally representative survey of around 5,500 households randomly selected South of the Caledonian Canal. The first wave of the BHPS was conducted in the autumn of 1991, and annually thereafter (for details, see Taylor (1996) ). Information on labour market status is recorded at each interview, and for the period beginning on 1 September a year prior to the interview. In addition to the normal set of questions, at the second wave of interviews (in 1992), respondents were asked to detail their complete labour market histories since leaving full-time education for the first time. In 1993, at the third wave, a complete job history data were also collected. The analysis presented in this paper uses information from regular questions as well as the two additional retrospective lifetime data.
At each interview, the respondent is asked about the current labour market status. Selecting men who were aged between 16 and 55 in 1991 and who were directly interviewed by an interviewer in 1991 gave a sample of 3352 men. 9 The top panel of Table 1 tabulates the total number of direct interviews against the number of employment observations at the time of the interview. Employment excludes self-employment. It is seen from Table 1 that only about 65% of men have two or more employment observations. Since the analysis is restricted to men who were continuously present in the Survey, the bottom panel of Table 1 presents the same figures for the restricted sample of men. Here, the number of employment observations counted is only over the waves the individual was continuously present.
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The reduced form probit equation for sample selection was estimated as one cross-section in order to account for the fact that there was an overall selection of at least two wage observations per individual over the sample period.
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Analysis of wages of women is more complicated because of interruptions related to family formation and therefore omitted from this work presented in this paper.
Of the 3352 men, 85.3 % (3352-494=2858 men) were continuously present for at least two years from 1991 (the first wave). The wage equations are estimated for the sub-sample of these men (1997) who said that they were in employment in at least two of the interviews.
RESULTS

Selection Equation
This involves the estimation of a reduced form probit using the variable 'employment in at least two waves' on the full sample. Pre-sample information and the 1991 recorded characteristics were used in the estimation of this selection equation. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if an individual was found to be in employment in at least two waves when he was continuously present from the beginning of the survey (1991) for at least two waves. The dependent variable is set to 0 if the above is not satisfied. Men who were only interviewed in 1991 and never after, men who were not present continuously in the survey, and men who were not in employment in at least two waves, were all coded as having a value of 0. The selection analysis is based on 3347 men. 10 The results from this probit equation are presented in Appendix Telephone interviews and proxy interviews were not used in the analysis presented here.
10
This figure is 5 less than the original figure of 3352 because of deletion of cases with missing values for variables used in the selection equation.
Wage equations
The dependent variable in the wage equation is the real hourly wage that was calculated by dividing the usual weekly gross pay by the usual weekly hours. 11 Unfortunately, the usual pay includes usual paid overtime as information excluding overtime payment is not available.
The main issue that is addressed in the paper is the effect of a spell of interruption on subsequent wages. In order to carry this out, previous labour market states considered are employment, unemployment and out-of-the labour force (OLF). Individuals in the sample categorise themselves into these categories. The retrospective information in the data set does not allow one to distinguish between those who were searching and those who were not searching during these spells. Information on whether the individual was in receipt of benefits during these spells of unemployment is also not available. The OLF category includes individuals who, had been long-term sick, had been at home looking after family, had been in education or training, etc.
For some individuals, the current employment is their first one since they entered the labour market after leaving full-time education. Previous job experience is zero for these individuals. Among the 162 men in the 'other' category, 21 are such spells. Although these individuals ('first-timers') are included in the above table, the analyses presented in this paper treat them as different to the 'out of the labour force' (OLF) category since these men were in full-time education prior to the current spell of employment.
The tenure variable used is the current employer tenure as recorded at the interview. This variable has been grouped into dummy variables instead of using the standard quadratic specification. The distribution of tenure by previous labour market status is given in Table 2 .
Looking at it from the perspective of current employment, 89% of current employment refers to an employment-to-employment transition. Only about 9% of current employment refer to an unemployment-to-employment transition.
The variables which are commonly thought to have an effect on wages such as age, highest qualification, type of job, sector of the firm, firm size, trade union membership etc. were included as controls. Descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analyses are presented in Table 3 . As expected, there are more men (i) aged less than 25, (ii) with lower educational qualifications, (iii) working for private companies, (iv) who had not received any work related training in the last twelve months, and (v) in manual jobs in the sample of men who had experienced an interruption prior to this employment compared to those who had not.
The estimates of the log real hourly wage equations for various models estimated, are summarised in Table 4 . There are 6332 person observations used in the analysis of the wages. In order to check for sensitivity of estimated results to the inclusion of various control variables, the models presented in the first two columns have been estimated with fewer controls compared to rest of the analyses. All models also have in addition to the variables indicated in the Table, age dummies, time dummies and a correction for selectivity interacted with time dummies. The previous labour market status variables are entered as dummies in Columns [1] to [3] . In this specification, the type of interruption the individual had prior to current employment is assumed to have a constant effect that persists over time, ceteris paribus. Columns [1] to [4] also have a dummy for those men who had come directly into the current employment spell from full-time education.
The estimated returns to tenure are as expected. Base case is a man who has tenure of less than 1 year and has come from a previous employment into this employment. Relative to this individual, for a man who has been previously unemployed, the returns to tenure is about 5-6% lower, at all levels of tenure, ceteris paribus (Columns [1] and [2] ). The individuals who had come from OLF state also fare very badly in terms of returns to tenure compared to the base 11
If 'hours worked' is measured with errors, using hourly earnings can suffer from measurement errors. But the use of weekly wages will not allow one to control for the fact that some individuals also might be 'scarred' in terms of going category. For these individuals, the returns are about 9% lower, ceteris paribus. Including other controls, does not change these estimated penalties significantly (see Column [3] ).
Columns [4] to [6] allow the effect of tenure to vary with the previous labour market status. Unlike the models in Columns [1] to [3] , these models allow one to check whether the 'scarring effect' of a spell of interruption diminishes over time or not. An individual coming from a spell of employment is estimated to earn on average 2-3% more in the second year relative to the first year, ceteris paribus. The average return to tenure in years two to five is estimated to be about 4%, which in terms of annual rate of return, is less than in the first two years. Thus, returns to tenure are estimated to be decreasing after the first two years with the same employer. The estimated average returns over the period five to ten years is about 6%.
But, when an individual enters employment after a spell of unemployment, he will earn about 5% less during his first year with the employer relative to someone who is also in his first year of employment but had come from another employment spell, ceteris paribus. 12 This differential is estimated to diminish over time but it takes more than five years for the differential to vanish (Columns [4] and [5] ). But note, this reference individual may have had a spell of unemployment in the past but has entered this spell of employment from another spell of employment. This issue is addressed in the next section.
An individual coming from the OLF state is worse off initially in the first two years compared to someone coming from after a spell of unemployment but does catch up after two years and is more 'scarred' during the first two years compared to an individual whose previous spell was unemployment. The estimated 'scarring' effect for men with 5 or more years of tenure is insignificant due to small cell sizes. Therefore, Column [6] looks at the effect of amalgamating the unemployment and out-of-the labour force statuses into one category of 'nonback to jobs with fewer hours.
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Gregory and Jukes estimated this penalty to be about 10% and Nickell et al (1999) estimated this to be about 12%. But the definition of unemployment used in these two studies refer to registered unemployment. unemployment'. 13 The estimated 'average scarring' effects up to the first five years are now significant.
As previously mentioned, a dummy for those individuals who entered this spell of employment straight after leaving full-time school ('first-timers') was entered in the regressions.
Interpretation of the coefficient on this dummy is more complicated because by definition these individuals have zero experience at the start of their current spell. Therefore, this dummy is essentially picking up the effect of lack of previous experience for these individuals. But, a comparison between two individuals who have zero experience is easier to make. For example, consider two individuals who have left full-time education and entered the current spell with one individual (Man1) without an intervening spell of unemployment and the other (Man2) with an intervening spell of unemployment. The former individual fares badly at the start of this spell presumably because the other individual has had more time to search and find a more suitable job and therefore a higher pay. In fact, Man1 is estimated to earn about 6% lower at the start of the current spell relative to Man2, ceteris paribus (Column [5] ). But, the effect of lack of previous experience only lasts for about 2 years (Column [6]).
Full-time employment experience is included in all the regressions to pick up the returns to accumulated general human capital. The experience variable used is the total full-time employment experience coded as dummies. The estimated returns are as expected. Returns to experience was not found to be dependent on the previous labour market status (results not reported in the table).
In summary, an individual who has just experienced a spell of interruption prior to the current employment spell is estimated to be 'scarred' in the sense of his returns to tenure being lower compared to an individual who had not. But this 'scarring' effect is estimated to diminish over time. These 'scarred' individuals have to work for more than years with the same employer 13 Paull (1997) notes that there is a tendency for individuals to redefine time in unemployment as time out of the labour force in the BHPS data set.
for the scarring effect of the interruption to completely vanish. Since the comparisons are made with an individual who has changed employment without an interruption, an interesting question to ask is whether it is possible to reduce the 'scarring' effect by changing employers. This and some other related issues are addressed in the next section.
MODEL EXTENSIONS
Unlike most of the other data sets which have been used in the past to look at the effects on wages of individuals who have been displaced, the data set used in the analyses presented in this paper has some extra information about the interruption itself. In particular, the type of interruption, the length of interruption and also the number of previous spells of unemployment experienced by the individuals are available. For most of the sample members, these are derived from information collected retrospectively. Given the possibility of recall errors, this information is used in an 'aggregate' manner to extend the previous analyses. The data also has many missing values. Instead of deleting observations with missing values, all the analyses were conducted with the inclusion of appropriate dummy variables for missing cases. The model presented in Column [6] of Table 4 was extended for these analyses and the results are presented in Table 6 . Some relevant frequencies are presented in Table 5 .
Effect of an interruption caused by a redundancy
The most important reason for leaving the last job was redundancy (Table 5 ). Of the 1258 men who were made redundant from their last job, 75% had managed to find employment without an intervening spell of 'non-employment'.
The estimated results which include a dummy for men who lost their last job because of redundancy are presented in Column [1] of Table 6 . This dummy was also interacted with the dummy for individuals who had made a non-employment to employment transition. 14 The estimated tenure effects are unchanged from previous analysis. The base case is a man who has made an employment-to-employment transition for 'non-redundancy' reason. Most of these individuals voluntarily changed their employers. If the individual was made redundant and if he changed employers without an intervening spell of 'non-employment', then he is not 'scarred' by the redundancy. But if the individual was made redundant and he did not move into another job immediately, then it is estimated that this individual is less 'scarred' compared to someone who loses his job for 'other' reasons, ceteris paribus. This individual is expected to earn, on average, 6% more than an individual who loses his job for 'other' reasons and finds employment via a spell of non-employment. The scarring effect of the previous spell of 'non-employment' is also now estimated to diminish after a period of five years if this individual has been made redundant, relative to someone who entered non-employment for 'other' reasons, ceteris paribus. This is in contrast to results generally found in the literature on the effects of 'displacement' on subsequent earnings. This is not surprising for the following reasons. First, the literature on the effects of displacement generally looks at 'high' tenure individuals for whom this might matter. This distinction is not possible with this data set. Second, there is a period of notice that has to be given by the employer prior to making someone redundant (Borland etal (1997) ), and some of these individuals are also eligible for redundancy payments and unemployment benefits. Individuals who quit their jobs voluntarily are disqualified from receiving benefits for up to 26 weeks. Given these reasons, it is possible that these individuals do start looking for a job early and are able to wait until they find something suitable.
Unfortunately, information on whether the individuals who were made redundant received any redundancy payments and if they did then the amount they had received, are not available in this data set. Information on the amount of benefits they received whilst unemployed is also not 14 Inclusion of dummies for reasons such as termination of employment because (i) a temporary job came to an available.
Another possible reason for the estimated results is that individuals who were made redundant were those possessing general skills and as a result the redundancy itself does not result in scarring due to loss of firm specific skills.
Effect of the length of the interruption
It is often believed that acquired human capital will depreciate during a spell of unemployment and the longer the interruption more the decline. As a result, many labour market policies have been aimed at preventing long spells of unemployment. In particular, there has been a programme of 'RESTART' in existence in this country since the 1986. Initially all individuals who have been unemployed for twelve months or more, and since 1987 all those who have been unemployed for six or more months are invited for counseling. These individuals are then introduced to available training and support. The benefit entitlements are also re-evaluated (Borland etal (1997) ). To see whether the length of the interruption has any effect on the estimated 'scarring' effect of an interruption on subsequent earnings, the base model (Column [6] Table 4 ) was re-estimated with the inclusion of two dummies for the length of the spell of interruption. To pick up the effect of RESTART Spells of six to twelve months of duration and a spell of longer than twelve months of duration were distinguished. The results from this extension are presented in Column [2] of Table 6 . Unfortunately there was no information on the length of the interruption for just over half the sample members who had experienced an interruption (Table 5 ). Without omitting these cases, a dummy for missing values was included in all the regressions.
The base case here is an individual who has had an interruption that lasted for less than six months. The estimated 'scarring' effect for individuals with an interruption that lasted for less than six months or lasted for over twelve months, is very similar to the previous estimated end, (ii) of dismissal, did not produce any significant results because of small cell sizes.
effects (Column [6] , Table 4 ). The 'scarring' effect of this interruption is estimated to diminish over time and disappears after about five years. In contrast, if an individual has had a spell of non-employment prior to this employment spell that lasted for about six to twelve months, it is estimated that this individual will be worse off. In fact, this individual is estimated to earn about 9% less than an otherwise equivalent individual whose interruption only lasted for a very short time. 15 It is possible that the negative effect found in this data set for the individuals who had been unemployed for six to twelve months is because of the RESTART programme. An important feature of this programme is the threat of benefits withdrawal if the individual does not attend the RESTART interview or if they are deemed not to be making genuine attempt to find a job. Dolton and O'Neill (1996) found that Restart interview scared individuals into signing-off and the timing of exits out of unemployment coincided with the first Restart interview.
Individuals are put under a lot of pressure to find suitable employment and it might be the case that these individuals go into low-pay jobs.
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Effect of previous spells of unemployment
Nearly 60% of those who had experienced a spell of interruption has also had another spell of unemployment prior to the last one (Table 5) . Among the men who had moved to this spell of employment via another spell of employment without an interruption, 40% had had a spell of unemployment sometime in the past. The models estimated in the previous section directly compared individuals who made employment-to-employment transitions with those who made this transition via a spell of non-employment. If a spell of non-employment has a 'scarring' effect on subsequent earnings, an interesting question to ask is whether the 'scarring' effect can be negated earlier by changing your employer without an intervening spell of non-employment.
Another way to pose this question is to ask whether previous spell of unemployment still has an 15 Gregory and Jukes (1997) and Nicekll etal (1999) found for Great Britain that long unemployment spells to be associated with greater wage losses.
effect after a subsequent change in employer, or is it the case that only the immediately preceding spell of unemployment matters. 17 The results of this investigation are presented in Column [3] of Table 6 .
The base case is a man who made an employment-to-employment transition and who also has never been unemployed before, say Man1. Relative to this man, an individual who experiences unemployment for the first time prior to coming into this job (say Man2), is estimated to be worse off by about 20% on average. If Man1 had experienced an unemployment spell in the past, he is estimated to be worse off by about 10% in terms of loss of earnings. If
Man2 has experienced another spell of unemployment prior to the last one, he is estimated to be less worse off in his current employment. Relative to a man who has never experienced a spell of unemployment, a man who experiences a spell of unemployment is estimated to be permanently 'scarred' in the sense of earning losses of about 10%. This is very similar to he figure estimated by Nickell etal. (1999) . In summary, returns to tenure in the employment spell after the first spell of unemployment is the worst affected.
CONCLUSIONS
This study has looked at the effects of unemployment on subsequent wages for men using the first six waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) conducted over the period 1991-1996. In particular, how the effect of an interruption on subsequent wages changes over time.
The issue of sample selection and unobserved heterogeneity were also addressed in the analyses.
The main findings of this study are:
(i) An unemployed individual when returning to work will earn about 5% less than an otherwise equivalent individual who has come from a spell of employment, during the first year of employment. This differential diminishes over time and it takes more than 17
The model estimated looks at the effect of a previous spell of unemployment and not of 'non-employment'. The reason for this is that it was felt that it would not be correct to include spells of OLF where some included spells of education five years of time with the employer to completely overcome the scarring effect of the interruption.
(ii) Relative to a man who has never experienced a spell of unemployment, a man who experiences a spell of unemployment is estimated to be permanently 'scarred' in the sense of earning losses of about 10%. (iii) It is the first spell of unemployment that has the largest effect on current employer tenure.
A man who goes into employment after experiencing his first unemployment spell is estimated to earn about 10% less relative to someone who has never experienced an unemployment spell.
(iv) Men who experience an interruption because of redundancy are found to be less scarred relative to men who have an interruption due to other reasons. Employment protection legislation require the employers to give prior notice of termination. These individuals can therefore start to search for jobs while in employment. The existence of redundancy payments as well as being able to claim benefits without being disqualified from benefit receipts also must help these individuals to search better for a more suitable job.
(v) The individuals who are most scarred by an interruption are those who have had spell lasting for about six to twelve months. This could be because of the existence of RESTART programme which targets individuals who are claiming benefits and have been unemployed for more than 6 months. Our results are consistent with Dolton and O'Neil (1996) Number of Employment-to-employment transitions = 5643; Number of Non-employment-to-employment transitions = 689. 2.
+ For the unemployed, this is in addition to the spell of unemployment under consideration as an interruption. Table 4. 2. In addition to all the previous variables, these models also have a dummy for cases with missing information on the reason for leaving previous employment in Column [1] , a dummy for cases with missing previous labour market status duration in Column [2] , and a dummy for cases with missing number of previous spells of unemployment in Column [3] . 3.
+ For the individuals who were unemployed in the previous state, one or more spell means that they have had at least one other spell of unemployment prior to the last one. 
Appendix:
